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ROBERT IMRE, T. BRIAN MOONEY, and BENJAMIN CLARKE. Responding to Terrorism: 
Political, Philosophical and Legal Perspectives. Farnham: Ashgate, 2008. 248 pp.
Few questions are considered as urgent as those related to our understanding of and 
response to terrorism. With the exception of threats from organizations such as the IRA 
and ETA, the developed world has been a relatively safe haven for quite some time. The 
past decade’s bombings of civilian targets in Europe and in the US, however, have 
revealed developed society’s vulnerability and radically altered its members’ perception 
of risk. Although suicide bombings and other acts of terror have been part of everyday 
life in many regions around the world, such attacks on Western targets have rendered 
combating terrorism a key priority. Even if an embarrassingly late response to a long-
standing global problem, terrorism is a pressing and highly complex issue, warranting a 
multidimensional response.
The authors of this anthology do not aspire to offer an exhaustive analysis of ter-
rorism or comprehensive solutions thereto. Rather, motivated by a confused debate on 
the subject, their main goal is to provide input that might support an improved under-
standing of the causes and motives behind terrorist behaviour and help us understand 
how terrorism should be addressed. 
Starting from their own field of expertise, senior research fellow Robert Imre, 
University of Newcastle, professor of philosophy T. Brian Mooney, Singapore Manage-
ment University (SMU) and Benjamin Clarke, senior lecturer at the University of Notre 
Dame provide their own analysis in each of the book’s four chapters. 
The first chapter addresses classical questions of how to define terrorism, terrorism 
for whom and why? To a degree, what is regarded as terrorism depends on the positions 
and interests of those using the label. Imre, for example, illustrates this point by showing 
how several American presidents have described the Mujahedeen as heroic freedom 
fighters while resisting Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and as terrorists when opposing 
the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. This chapter also focuses on the causes and motives 
behind terrorism and terrorist behaviour, investigating the relevance of aspects like pov-
erty (relative and absolute), ethnicity, minority, self-government and oppression.
The second chapter focuses on the question of torture and whether it can be 
understood as a morally justifiable and/or effective response to terrorism. Imre argues 
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that while torture is an effective means of social control, deterring citizens from skate-
boarding on sidewalks and/or from expressing their opinion etc, it is inefficient when 
it comes to stifling terrorism. Moreover, the usefulness of information extracted by 
means of torture can be called into question and the danger exists that side-stepping 
international law and human rights by allowing for the torture of terrorists under certain 
conditions can lead to the use of torture for other purposes, such as standard criminal 
investigations. More to the point, Imre argues that violence feeds violence and that torture 
will only galvanize the positions of terrorists, solidifying terrorist groups, radicalizing rad-
icals. Contrary to his fellow authors, and based on the writings of Thomas Aquinas, 
Mooney argues that torture, while an intrinsic evil and a tragedy, may be justifiable under 
certain extreme circumstances. 
The third chapter discusses whether international terrorism is an inevitable conse-
quence of globalization. It points out that the preconditions for terrorism have changed 
significantly with developments in information technology (IT) now exploited by terror-
ists to create and maintain transnational networks. IT facilitates the transfer of funding, 
logistics, proliferation of propaganda, recruitment and the planning of attacks. Discussing 
conflicting values in a globalized world, Mooney suggests a narrative approach as a way 
to illuminate fundamental disagreements between and within cultures and religious tradi-
tions. He states that most of our deeply held positions stem from habituation rather than 
from reasoned enquiry, and suggests story telling as a strategy to identify dimensions that 
“create” our beliefs in order to be able to overcome radical disagreements. 
The fourth and final chapter seeks to address the elements necessary for an effec-
tive global response to terrorism. It evaluates possible strategies for responding to ter-
rorism such as government policies, social engineering and just war. In this chapter, 
Clarke reminds us how easy it is to destroy the social fabric, emphasizing the need for 
states to comply with the rule of law and human rights, promote dialogue and democracy 
and address injustices that fuel radical Islam. While Imre and Clarke are of the opinion 
that the rule of law must prevail and that extra legal measures are endemic to democratic 
values and counterproductive to long term stability, Mooney warns that a strict reliance 
on already established legislation and the right procedure may serve to diminish indi-
vidual responsibility. 
Given the book’s rather vague goal – to provide a better understanding of a com-
plex phenomenon such as terrorism by means of a series of “contemplations” – the 
authors of this anthology cannot be criticized for failing to deliver accordingly. Highly 
relevant questions are addressed and ideas on how to respond to terrorism in sustainable 
ways are offered. What might be questioned, however, are the aspects an anthology 
responding to terrorism should preferably address, given the plethora of books dealing with 
the same topic. Undoubtedly, the legal perspective on terrorism is of central importance 
and Clarke provides an excellent overview of the legal framework relevant to an adequate 
response, showing how the international community can and should outlaw terrorism. 
As with many other discussions on terrorism, however, this anthology lacks the psycho-
logical perspective necessary for a deeper understanding of terrorists and terrorist behav-
iour. Furthermore, and despite the authors’ insistence that terrorism is not a “Middle 
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Eastern” or “Islamic” problem, they primarily focus on acts of terror emanating from 
radical Islam. Given this particular focus and in light of a general underrepresentation 
of non-Western Muslim perspectives on terrorism, such views would have been most 
illuminating and could have been accommodated by means of the narrative approach 
suggested by Mooney. 
Elin Palm
Division of Philosophy, The Royal Institute of Technology
Stockholm, Sweden
MAHESH ANANTH. In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of Health: Nature, Norms and 
Human Biology. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2008. 237 pp.
Mahesh Ananth’s In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of Health is based on his PhD dis-
sertation. Taking Christopher Boorse’s concept of health and its critics as his starting 
point and major thread, he successfully develops his own evolutionary concept of health, 
which is basically an adaptation of Boorse’s.
Ananth sets the stage by introducing two different approaches to the concept of 
health. Some see health and disease as value-free concepts and as somatic conditions 
and adopt a naturalistic viewpoint. Others, however, are of the opinion that values and 
social concerns are indispensible components of the concept of health and are more 
inclined to adopt a normative viewpoint. Boorse himself maintains a function-based 
naturalistic view. The author describes Boorse’s critique of different naturalistic and 
normative concepts: he rejects statistical, homeostatic and evolutionary concepts as well 
as strong and weak normative views. Ananth agrees with many of Boorse’s critiques, 
but thinks that his critique of the evolutionary concept of health is too gene-centered. 
The author discusses Larry Wright’s concept of function and Boorse’s reply, suggesting 
an approach that combines the strengths of both and leaves out their limitations. He 
then offers the reader a thorough overview of Boorse’s concept of health, which pic-
tures health and disease in relation to the biological functions of parts of an organism. 
Ananth discusses some of Boorse’s critics and suggests that Boorse has successfully 
addressed their objections, except that of ‘bad biology’. Ananth claims that Boorse’s 
views about natural selection are inconsistent. Following this critique, the author sketches 
his own view on health, which is one of organism homeostasis and intercellular homeo-
stasis, with adaptive functions justified by way of natural selection. Such an approach, 
according to the author, takes gender and age differences into account when contemplat-
ing health versus disease. Ananth applies his theory in five case studies: tuberculosis, 
allergies, down, sickle-cell anemia and osteoporosis. He finishes his book with a discus-
sion on the unit of selection, rejecting both genes as well those who uphold the indi-
vidual as the main unit of selection. 
In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of Health is a detailed philosophical exploration 
of one specific topic and to a major extent of one philosopher: Christopher Boorse. 
Boorse’s ideas and their critics are elaborated and sometimes countered with illustrative 
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examples from different fields (dentistry, evolution, allergies). Ananth’s style is meticu-
lous, sometimes even tedious, and some degree of concentration is needed to read his 
book through to the end. The last chapter, in which he develops his own evolutionary 
concept of health, is original and clear, especially if one is ready to accept the premises 
of a norm-free concept of health. The volume’s discussion of the unit of selection is 
good as an introduction, but falls short on detailed argumentation. As a whole, however, 
this book offers a good overview for those interested in a theoretical reflection on the 
concept of health.
Kristien Hens
Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law, K.U.Leuven
GRANT GILLETT. Subjectivity and Being Somebody: Human Identity and  Neuroethics. 
Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008. 286 pp.
Grant Gillett’s Human Identity and Neuroethics is an account of human identity based on 
a narrative concept of the human subject. Taking this narrative concept as his point of 
departure, Gillett tries to grasp what is persistent about human identity. He illustrates 
his way of thinking with a myriad of examples from stem cell research, conceptions of 
memory, neurological conditions such as split brain syndrome, locked in syndrome and 
schizophrenia, thought experiments with human embryos, etc. Throughout the book, 
he uses and quotes philosophers and thinkers from many different traditions, including 
Aristotle, Nietzsche, Lacan, Levinas, and Sartre.
Gillett sets about illustrating his theory by evoking some issues surrounding stem 
cell research and embryos. In this preliminary chapter, he points out that there is a 
fundamental difference between using embryos for stem cell research and for reproduc-
tive purposes. The difference lies in the latter – the embryo – being ‘in the process of 
becoming’, an attribute that is central to his way of thinking about identity. In the chap-
ters that follow, he further develops this idea of human beings as having a certain form 
and developmental trajectory, as being holistic and longitudinally extended. Human 
beings, according to Gillett, are works in progress, are dependent on a narrative context. 
They are formed by participating in discourse and by taking part in a moral world 
together with other subjects. In this way, becoming a cognitive subject goes hand in 
hand with becoming a moral subject. Gillett explicitly rejects both the Cartesian view 
that separates mind and body and sees the subject as noting more than a mental entity 
as well as the reductionist view that we are merely a collection of neurological functions. 
This viewpoint gives him a framework to tackle ethical issues surrounding Persistent 
Vegetative State, for example, or the treatment of schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, 
cyborgs and much more. 
Gillett’s narrative concept of the subject is interesting and useful. It is also courageous 
to evoke ‘poststructuralist’ thinkers such as Lacan and Foucault in a climate in which 
reductionist views of the mind and the brain are omnipresent. This is one of the reasons 
why this book is worth reading. A second reason relates to the many clearly elaborated 
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thought experiments and examples Gillett uses to illustrate his point. Subjectivity and Being 
Somebody is not, however, an easy read. Although fresh and even comical in some sections, 
the author’s style is often obscure and fragmented. He uses so many philosophers from 
totally different traditions that it is easy to lose track of the argument. In addition, those 
who follow the book’s title and are looking for an overview of issues related to neuro-
ethics will be disappointed: this is first and foremost a work of philosophy rather than 
applied ethics. The first chapter of the book, which is intended as an overview of the 
ground to be covered is not very inviting. In the last analysis, however, those who per-
severe and read on will not be disappointed: the book contains an overwhelming amount 
of interesting ideas, making it well worth the effort needed to finish it. 
Kristien Hens
Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law, K.U.Leuven
ALEXANDER S. ROSENTHAL. Crown under Law: Richard Hooker, John Locke, and
the Ascent of Modern Constitutionalism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. 
325 pp. 
What are the historical and theoretical origins of the modern state and our modern idea 
of constitutionalism? Confronted with this question, many philosophers will immediately 
refer to important politico-juridical developments that took place in the 16th and 17th 
century – like the peace treaties of Osnabruck and Münster – and the works of (early) 
modern thinkers like Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, or John Locke. They would not be 
likely, however, to mention developments in the 14th, 13th or maybe even 12th century, 
or point to the works of medieval political and legal theorists.
Many academics agree, nevertheless, that this historical narrative reveals a gross 
oversimplification. They argue that the historical and theoretical origins of the modern 
state and constitutionalism can be located in the centuries preceding the peace of West-
phalia and in the writings of some medieval theorists. Take for example Strayer’s On the 
Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton University Press, 1970), Tierney’s Religion, 
Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650 (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
or more recently some of the work of Hauke Brunkhorst.
Alexander Rosenthal’s Crown under Law should be understood against this back-
ground. His main goal is to present Richard Hooker – the English theologian and 
political theorist – as a mediator between the medieval and modern tradition of political 
thought, and to argue that we need a more complex understanding of the relationship 
between both. One simply cannot – as Leo Strauss, for example, does – work with a 
stringent divide. The ascent of constitutionalism, according to Rosenthal, can be seen 
as “emerging [not] from a radical effort to overthrow the traditional order of thought 
and society, but as an effort to preserve elements of this order from the novel claims 
made on behalf of modern state power in the person of the king” (246).
Rosenthal explicitly shares the Cambridge School’s emphasis on intellectual history 
and the history of political philosophy. His book should, therefore, be primarily seen as 
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an effort to contribute to such a history. This translates not only into an extensive sketch 
of Hooker’s place in Stuart and Restoration England and of the historical context of 
Locke’s work, but also into several short excursuses on historical settings and the history 
of concepts – such as a discussion of the doctrine of predestination in Christian theology 
or an elaboration of the controversy between Calvinists and Anglicans on the theology 
of the Church.
In the first part of the book, Rosenthal examines the historical context in which 
Hooker wrote – Elizabethan England – and explains Hooker’s place within our tradition 
of political philosophy. He meticulously demonstrates that Hooker should not only be 
seen as an important figure in the influential tradition of English political thought, but 
that he also succeeded in mediating between medieval and modern political philosophy; 
or, to be more precise, between the Aristotelian/Thomistic framework of political 
thought and early modern English political discourse. 
In the second part of the book, Rosenthal examines Hooker’s historical and philo-
sophical importance for seventeenth century English political thought, discusses Locke’s 
Whig interpretation of Hooker, and explains how Hooker’s political philosophy informed 
Locke’s constitutionalism. Rosenthal ends by elaborating the continued relevance of 
Hooker’s work for our contemporary debates in political philosophy.
Two appendices are attached to the final conclusion of the book. In the first, 
Rosenthal extensively discusses and rejects Strauss’ reading of John Locke as a radical 
modernist. In the second, he explains the main lines of the debate between Lockean 
scholars on the precise nature of his theory of natural law.
Although these chapters and appendices give an interesting and comprehensive 
account of Hooker’s relevance for the rise of modern constitutional thought, the book 
sometimes lacks analytical clarity. Rosenthal focuses too much on occasion on the 
detailed elaboration of the historical context and intellectual legacy of Richard 
Hooker. The attachment of two appendices nicely illustrates this point. This does not 




HUMBERTO MATURANA ROMESIN and GERDA VERDEN-ZOLDER. The Origin of 
Humanness in the Biology of Love. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008. 227 pp.
In The Origin of Humanness in the Biology of Love, Humberto Maturana Romesin sets out 
to define the essence of humanness and to explain how Homo sapiens came to exist as 
distinct from other primates. In the first half of the book, he explains that his idea of 
evolution is a systemic one. Rather than being the result of fortunate genetic transforma-
tions, species are a result of a history of systemic conservation of a manner of living. 
Human beings in particular are the result of “a primate evolutionary history in the con-
servation of a manner of living that entails sexuality, sensuality and tenderness, entwined 
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in the daily living in the biologies of love and intimacy” (140). He thus disagrees with 
the approach that takes the culture of chimpanzees, which is based on aggression and 
dominion, as a blueprint for our own evolutionary road. According to Maturana, we are 
truly a Homo sapiens amans. The phrase The Biology of Love is used in the second half of 
the book semi-religiously. Besides being an explanatory framework, Maturana also uses 
the concept as a guiding principle on how to proceed with humankind: rather than 
continuing the route of aggression, which Western society has followed for the last few 
thousands of years, we should go back to living in a primordial relation of love and trust, 
which is a matriarchic society. Only if we do so can we truly live according to our own 
human nature. 
The Origin of Humanness in the Biology of Love is a bizarre book from the outset.
Its extremely long foreword resembles a eulogy and is followed by a General Reflection, a 
Prologue and a chapter entitled Fundaments. At the end of the book, we find ten long 
appendices elaborating some of the ideas of the rest of the book and repeating others, 
an approach that I thought was not altogether successful. Some parts of the book are 
easy to follow, but the more epistemological chapters and appendices are very difficult 
and sometimes even obscure. Both Maturana’s explanation of the origin of humanness 
through love and his view that our humanness has become somewhat twisted over the 
last thousand decades can be interpreted as mere just-so stories. Indeed, there are few 
references to other scientific findings that might support this hypothesis. As a matter of 
fact, the book contains very few references at all, beyond those referring to Maturana’s 
own publications. The book would have benefitted from referring to recent studies in 
primatology, specifically with regard to bonobos. In this respect, the author’s claim that 
this is basically a work of science has to be taken with a grain of salt. His transition from 
what we are to how we should live would make many ethicists frown. And yet, some 
of the ideas he describes are refreshing and innovative, and I must say I enjoyed reading 
this book. Many great ideas that have changed the way we look at things have arisen 
out of the blue, and were often considered at first to be nothing more than scientific 
ranting and raving. I shall leave it up to the reader to decide whether this book is just 
that or full of great ideas. 
Kristien Hens
Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law, K.U.Leuven
TZU-WAN KWAN (ed.). Responsibility and Commitment: Eighteen Essays in Honor of 
Gerhold K. Becker. Waldkirch: Edition Gorz, 2008. 296 pp.
This Festschrift has been compiled and published in honour of Gerhold Becker, a dis-
tinguished figure in Applied Ethics. Becker founded the Hong Kong Centre for Applied 
Ethics and built up a strong international reputation in the areas of ethics and person-
hood, theology and religion, philosophy and philology, and philosophical links between 
East and West. In short, Becker has show himself to be a formidable bridge builder 
between practice, academic disciplines, and cultures.
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Like most volumes of this kind, the present example is something of a curate’s egg. 
The title follows the Weberian distinction between responsibility and commitment and 
has several chapters that focus on these themes. Rudolph Post offers a very useful 
lexical history of the terms, one that reminds us that any understanding of them has to 
be argued not taken as a historical given. 
The theme of responsibility gets off to an interesting start with Elisabeth Telfer 
reflecting on the responsible use of humour. It is a thoughtful piece, but it does not 
really focus on what responsible humour might be, other than avoiding the reinforce-
ment of negative stereotypes. Telfer suggests that it might be impossible for this to 
happen in television sitcoms, partly because we tend to identify with the main figures. 
Hence Alf Garnett, the working class bigot of Till Death Us Do Part, can elicit more 
sympathy than the intended disapproval. Other examples, such as the recent Canadian 
Muslim sitcom, The Little Mosque on the Prairie, however, demonstrate a strong sense of 
responsibility, precisely through enabling viewers to look more closely at the dynamics 
of moral and cultural debate. The chapter would have benefited from a more detailed 
look at what Telfer meant by responsibility. Maureen Sie begins to do this in an interest-
ing chapter reviewing behavioural, cognitive and neuroscientific research, suggesting that 
because of a lack of agentic transparency it is difficult to see how anyone can be truly 
aware of what drives them. Hence, the idea of the responsible agent is lost. Sie gives a 
solid rejoinder to this. Far from exempting us from bearing responsibility, this research 
demands that we should attend more clearly to these complexities. Intriguingly, Sie sug-
gests that this demands more attention to the interpersonal aspects of responsibility. It is 
not far from this to the idea of transpersonal work, and from that to the idea that 
spirituality, involving the constant development of awareness and responsiveness, is 
central to the idea of responsibility.
Michael Sievernich takes responsibility from immutability to liability and a consid-
eration of responsibility and globalization. He reviews the work of Weber and Jonas, 
and pleads for greater intentionality in responsibility. He echoes the call for religion to 
take a larger part in this debate 
Kajorpat Tangyin takes responsibility into the deeper waters of Levinas, stressing 
responsibility as focused in the other. Hence, responsibility is asymmetrical, expecting 
nothing from the other in return. The idea that this transcends egoism chimes with a 
lot of Islamic views of responsibility.
After these interesting chapters, Peter Momose’s and Stephan Rothin’s chapters 
are lightweight, and perhaps more importantly do not take a critical argument forward. 
Momose looks at the responsibility of the Christian Faith in relation to plurality in the 
Asian context. Taking his lead from Rahner, Momose suggests that Christian concepts 
such as revelation and incarnation have universal roots. It is not always clear how far 
this takes us beyond a responsibility to articulate ideas, many of which are claimed to 
have universal roots by several religions. 
Rothlin’s chapter is a disappointment. It does give an interesting view of what an 
‘Oriental’ university might be, but does not do what it says in the title, i.e. reflect on 
training students in social responsibility and commitment. Any debate about responsibility 
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inevitably leads us to the domain of education. It is hard to see how this can be done 
without some sense of what responsibility means and how this might be addressed in 
the curriculum, beyond simply talking about responsibility. This raises important ques-
tions about the relationship between responsibility and the learning experience that are 
simply not touched on.
The rest of the book is similarly variable, with excellent chapters from Georges 
Enderle (on the Golden Rule in a global context), Reiner Wimmer (on interreligious 
peace), and Kwok-ying Lau (on Derrida’s hermeneutics of friendship and its political 
implications).
This then is an interesting but patchy book, which effectively develops some of the 
debates around the issues of responsibility and commitment and touches on interfaith 
and inter-cultural relations and ethics. Perhaps, most of all, it reminds us that some of 
the really interesting developments in the debate emerge from extending it across cul-
tures, and this is a valid recognition of Becker’s work in this area. As a book, however, 
it might have paid Becker more effective homage had it focused on a more closely 
argued dialogue around the title. 
I would add two things. First, the claim that religion has much to add to debates 
on ethics and responsibility needs to be tested in wider debate with philosophers and 
practitioners. Second, there is an increasing conversation with Muslim scholars around 
universal responsibility, and little of this is reflected in the book.
Simon Robinson
Leeds Met University
JAKOB ARNOLDI. Risk: An Introduction. London: Polity, 2009. 215 pp.
This is a very competent book that succeeds in its aim to introduce different sociologi-
cal approaches to risk. It is important not to expect too much, however, which is some-
thing that can be said of sociological theories as a whole. It is interesting to know about 
Douglas’s social constructionist theory of risk. Our identification of risk depends upon 
a whole set of cultural and moral values and social perspectives – one person’s risk is 
another’s everyday experience. Beck invites us to see more of the ‘reality’ of the risk 
that we face from the environment or new technologies. He suggests that any social 
constructivist approaches have to relate to these realities. Other theories look at how 
societies and governments seek to control risk, and Arnoldi lays his sociological cards 
on the table at the end of the book by suggesting that governments are focusing increas-
ingly on the responsibility of the individual and moving away from taking responsibility 
for risk to the person.
Arnoldi begins by focusing on different areas of risk, from risk created by technol-
ogy, the relationship of risk to science and to cultures, and the development of a risk 
culture in the leisure and finance industries. These are very useful reflections on develop-
ments across society, but, as always, it is difficult to draw convincing conclusions about 
late modernity being more of a ‘risk society’ than any other. The conclusions that 
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Arnoldi attempts to draw are that we are a society that is more aware of uncertainty and 
risk, and at the same time a society that calculates risk and tries to manage it as never 
before. It hardly surprising, however, that an awareness of risk leads to attempts to 
manage that risk better. In turn, this leads to questions that Arnoldi does not begin to 
follow. Is there really evidence of increased awareness of risk, or is it that ‘late moder-
nity’ finds it hard to accept the idea of risk? Or is the increased concern with engaging 
risk to do with an increased awareness of responsibility? In previous eras, it could be 
argued that risks were even more directly apparent, but either they were accepted, often 
through elaborate ritual, as part of a culture that was more accepting of death, or there 
was simply no sense of responsibility. It took a long time, for instance, for the respon-
sibility for public health to be included as part of social and healthcare policy.
Once sociology moves away from the development of theory to the description of 
what is happening, however confident it may sound, it moves into enormous generalisa-
tions, and I am not convinced that it can carry the weight of those set out by Arnoldi. The 
author’s certitude about the increased individualisation of responsibility may be down to 
the fact that he is Dean and Director of Research at Aarhus School of Business, and is 
thus confronted with a greater individualisation of responsibility in the business world. But 
even in this domain, it is not clear that there is a simple move towards individualisation. 
In the context of a global economy, Anglo American, for instance, has accepted respon-
sibility, together with local communities and host nations, for developing community 
responses to and education around HIV Aids (Anglo American Report to Society 2005). 
Initially, the self-interest of the corporation led it to be responsible for this risk to employ-
ees. This then developed into a shared responsibility for wider education. Similar stories 
can be told by many different organisations. All of these point to an increased sense of 
shared responsibility and the importance of developing the means to negotiate responsi-
bilities. Other evidence in the field of health and safety, for example, points to increased 
legislation that focuses on corporate responsibility for risk. The expansion of health and 
safety to well-being addresses the risk of stress in the workplace and the responsibility of 
the corporation to develop a culture that can handle more refined definitions of risk.
In the wider field of healthcare, there is an increased stress on patient autonomy, and with 
that an increased concern to specify the risk of any medical procedure. In the area of 
alcohol addiction, for example, this even focuses on the responsibility of the addict to stop 
drinking before any medical procedure, such as a liver transplant, can be performed. Such 
examples are still in the context of shared responsibility for health, however, and they 
suggest that what is being seen is an increased stress on the negotiation of responsibility, 
not simply the individuation of responsibility. 
As I suggested at the beginning of this review, this book does what it says on the 
label, taking us through sociology and risk. It recognises that this involves inter-disci-
plinary work, but ultimately the issues raised suggest the need for much more work, 
particularly with regard to the relationship between risk and responsibility. At this point 
ethics should take up the baton.
Simon Robinson
Leeds Met University
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LORI GRUEN, LAURA GRABEL, and PETER SINGER (eds.). Stem Cell Research: The 
Ethical Issues. London: Blackwell, 2007. 209 pp. 
While the volume under review leaves the impression of being a collection of papers 
delivered at a conference, unlike most such volumes the standard of the various chapters 
is consistently high, and there is little deviation from one side of the debate – that stem 
cell research is ethically acceptable. Hence, the book should be recommended reading 
for all who have their doubts about such activity. 
The chapter by Katrien Devolder and John Harris is in many respects the corner-
stone of the volume, with other chapters developing their themes. They explore the 
arguments that characterise the embryo as having special moral status and conclude that 
the embryo is ontologically ambiguous, such that it is hard to support claims about its 
rights or interests. They point out that if embryos did have such a moral status then it 
would seem inconsistent not to give more attention to the loss of embryos in natural 
and assisted reproduction. Devolder and Harris conclude that given the absence of 
strong arguments against stem cell research and the fact that current practice does not 
support moral status of the embryo, it would be misguided to go for a compromise 
position. Diverse opinions can be respected, but opinion that is not based in rational 
argument cannot be used as the basis for legislation in this matter. The stress on ratio-
nal argument is a strong card to play, especially as proponents of both sides tend to see 
their position as based in respect and concern for the embryo and the wider social context. 
It does raise major issues about moral and premoral goods expressed in religious doctrines 
rather than rational arguments, but the part that religion plays in this debate is not 
addressed at all. Tännsjö has some concern for the way we handle the issue of different 
moral perspectives, but ultimately argues that the values of a liberal democracy trump 
those of any moral rights group. 
In all this, the book works impressively and convincingly through the various argu-
ments related to stem cell research, but does not really begin to sort out the issues of 
what does not count as rational argument, and how religions can have a part to play in 
such a debate. This comes to a head in some respects with McMahan’s chapter. Intrigu-
ingly, he supports that view of Devolder and Harris, focusing in on the statement that 
we are not ‘human organisms’. What makes us human is not the biological ‘base-some-
thing’ that we share with the embryo, but rather our metaphysical base. Hence, we 
cannot simply identify ourselves with the embryo and assume that the end of an embryo 
is equivalent to the death of an adult human being. Like Devolver and Harris, McMahan 
wants us to connect to this understanding of humanity and to remain coherent in our 
practices with regard to embryos. The problem with the argument, however, is McMa-
han’s use of metaphysics. If our view of humanity is rooted in metaphysics (informed 
by biological facts), then it is not clear that this relates to rational arguments. One per-
son’s metaphysics…. This focuses on core understandings of humanity, and again on 
defining appropriate respectful behaviour. 
The rest of the book drills down deeper. Sagan and Singer take the debate about 
embryos to the cellular level and argue against moral status with thinking that parallels 
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Devolder and Harris. Harmen compares the embryo with the abortion debate, noting 
the major differences. Devolder and Ward look at the alternatives to this research. Again 
all these are informed by careful argument. The only surprising piece is by Gruen, who 
advocates that women should be able to sell their eggs for research, thus promoting 
options for women. 
The book offers us many rational arguments, but leaves open a number of gaps 
that require more thoughtful engagement with the ‘other side’. 
Simon Robinson
Leeds Met University
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